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I. INTRODUCTION 
errorists are front and center in today’s world. Global terrorists 
incite outrage and fear. They lead to much hand-wringing and the 
expenditure of countless sums. The concept of home-grown terrorists 
has also entered the national security nomenclature, perhaps more 
reviled because, locally born and bred, they are reasonably expected to 
have fealty rather than enmity towards their country of origin. Then 
there is a local terrorist of another sort: the intimate terrorist.1 
Intimate terrorism, as defined by Michael Johnson in his book, A 
Typology of Domestic Violence,2 is “violence deployed in the service 
of general control” over a partner.3 With the threat of violence as a 
cudgel, the intimate terrorist may be able to exercise non-violent 
control over a partner by: (1) threats and intimidation; (2) monitoring; 
(3) undermining the will to resist; and (4) undermining the ability to 
resist.4 
Intimate terrorists have long coercively controlled their partners 
using both violent and non-violent methods. Modern technology now 
makes this exercise of control much easier. How the ubiquity of 
technology has enhanced the intimate terrorist’s powers can be 
examined through the fictional character of Frances Flynn Benedetto. 
Fran is the emergency room nurse, mother, and long-time battered 
woman at the center of Anna Quindlen’s novel, Black and Blue.5 Set in 
the late 1990s, the story relays how Fran escaped, with her son Robert, 
from her husband Bobby. Bobby Benedetto was a police officer and 
intimate terrorist. At one point during the years of violence before Fran 
left, she came to the realization that she could not just leave; rather, 
she would have to disappear.6 Finally, after one beating too many, 
Fran contacted a woman whom she had heard speak at a session on 
domestic violence for emergency room personnel at her hospital. That 
woman, Patty Bancroft, helped victims escape. Within hours of the 
contact, Patty provided Fran and her son Robert with new identities 
and had them chauffeured to Philadelphia. In the Philadelphia train 
station, a stranger dropped train tickets on the floor near where Fran 
and her son stood; the tickets were for them. They boarded a train to 
                                                            
1 MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE 
TERRORISM, VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE (2008). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 6. 
4 Id. at 26–29. 
5 ANNA QUINDLEN, BLACK AND BLUE (1998). 
6 Id. at 73. 
T 
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Florida, where another stranger picked them up and delivered them to 
a shabby apartment to begin a new life. 
Secrecy, Patty Bancroft had told the emergency room staff, is the 
key to helping battered women successfully escape their tormentors.7 
Unfortunately, in this high-tech age, secrecy can be hard to achieve8 
and its relative, privacy, is an antiquated notion. Technology has 
dramatically shifted what, how, and to whom information is disclosed. 
Social intercourse is now conducted through the varied media that fit 
loosely within the technology rubric. People communicate to the 
multitudes through social media, e.g. Facebook and Twitter, as well as 
receive communication in this manner from friends or celebrities. 
On an individual basis, texting has supplanted the more old-
fashioned mobile telephone call or even email. AAA TripTiks have 
gone the way of the rotary telephone. GPS programs on phones and 
computer tablets provide directions, of course, but also real-time 
monitoring and geolocation.9 Small electronics with advanced 
technological capacity are now practically appendages for many. 
Benefits and pleasures accrue from technology, but detriments and 
horrors also lurk therein. Nowhere are these negative uses of 
technology more apparent than in the area of intimate terrorism. 
Intimate terrorism is centuries old. Once authorized by law,10 it is now 
outlawed. But it is a persistent crime, eluding laws to stop; technology 
has made it easier. 
Although the impact of technology on domestic violence has been 
discussed for some years in varied literature,11 the ways in which the 
                                                            
7 Id. at 63. 
8 See generally Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical 
and Constitutional Barriers, 31 PACE L. REV. 228 (2011). 
9 See Daniel Ionescu, Geolocation 101: How It Works, the Apps, and Your 
Privacy, PC WORLD (Mar. 29, 2010, 10:45 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article
/192803/geolocation_101_how_it_works_the_apps_and_your_privacy.html 
(geolocation is the “tech buzzword” to define the software available for smart phones 
to both transmit data about the phone’s (and phone user’s) location and receive 
location data). 
10 See, e.g., Shelly M. Santry, Can You Find Me Now: Amanda’s Bill: A Case 
Study in the Use of GPS in Tracking Pretrial Domestic Violence Offenders, 29 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1101, 1103 (2011) (initially, English law gave a husband a right 
to “chastise,” i.e., beat, his wife). 
11 See, e.g., Laura Silverstein, Double Edged Sword, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 97 
(2004-05); Cindy Southworth et al., High-Tech Twist on Abuse: Technology, 
Intimate Partner Stalking, and Advocacy, 1 FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION & 
HEALTH PRAC. 3–5 ( 2005), available at http: //www.mincava.umn.edu/documents
/commissioned/stalkingandtech/stalkingandtech.pdf. 
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law deals with technology are emerging more slowly. Several 
problems emerge in assessing the value of the legal changes. First, the 
changes to combat technologically enhanced intimate terrorism are 
spread throughout the civil and criminal legal systems and, thus, are 
hard to track. Moreover, the comparisons between legal efforts in one 
state as opposed to another may be inconclusive or, worse, inaccurate 
because the laws are not necessarily parallel. Also, the changes have 
been piecemeal and their efficacy is largely untested. Finally, the 
diffuse nature of technology allows for imprecise generalizations and 
impedes concrete categorization.12 
This article begins with a brief intimate terrorism primer. It then 
proceeds to examine some of the specific ways in which technological 
issues affect domestic violence. This discussion will include how 
technology—broadly defined—has been useful in combating intimate 
terrorism. It will also explore ways in which technology has increased 
the capacity of the intimate terrorist. Next, the article will consider 
some recent legislative efforts to confront the problem of domestic 
violence and technology. Finally, after examining the current legal 
landscape, the article will discuss some issues that still need attention. 
II. INTIMATE TERRORISM AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
In A Typology of Domestic Violence,13 Michael P. Johnson laments 
domestic violence generalizations and sets out to identify subsets 
within the larger rubric. After analyzing the available research and 
literature, he argues that there are four distinct types of domestic 
violence: intimate terrorism, violent resistance, situational couples 
violence, and mutual violent control.14 Of these types, intimate 
terrorism most closely resembles the prototypical pattern of domestic 
violence, which is now understood as, at its core, being about coercive 
control of the victim/survivor.15 The other types of domestic violence 
identified by Johnson do not involve “coercive control.”16 They may 
                                                            
12 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
13 JOHNSON, supra note 1. 
14 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 7–12. 
15 It has become common to refer to survivors rather than victims. However, 
some don’t survive. Nonetheless, the terms victim and survivor will be used 
interchangeably in this article. 
16 See Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman 
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 986 (1995) (Dr. Evan Stark 
uses the term coercive control to indicate the type of generally non-violent behavior 
that a batterer exercises over his victim, noting that this “ongoing strategy of 
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involve self-defense or a generally aggressive disposition,17 but the 
batterer is not trying to control the victim through coercion, violent or 
otherwise.18 
Over the past two generations, domestic violence has received an 
enormous amount of attention. It has come out into the open; no longer 
may it hide under the cloak of family privacy. After centuries of no 
laws dealing with domestic violence,19 each state now has a statute 
authorizing protection orders for domestic violence victims.20 These 
statutes are routinely amended to expand the category of persons 
protected, the actions prohibited, or the remedies available. 
The expansion of the category of persons who are now protected 
under protection order statutes or under criminal domestic assault 
statutes is largely laudable. It demonstrates an understanding of the 
changed nature of intimate partners in American society. That status is 
                                                                                                                                            
intimidation, isolation, and control . . . extends to all areas of a woman’s life. . ..” 
(emphasis in original). Stark argues that the batterer’s occasional violence makes this 
strategy of coercive control effective.). 
17 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 60–71. 
18 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 17. 
19 See Santry, supra note 10. 
20 ALA. CODE § 30-5-3 (2011); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2011); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN § 13-3602 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-207 (West 2011); CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 6218 (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-102 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 46b-15 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (West 2011); D.C. CODE § 16-1005 
(2011); FLA. STAT. § 741.30 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (West 2011); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-3 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6304 (West 2011); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-2 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.4 (West 2011); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725 (West 
2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4007 
(2011); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 209A, § 7 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-2950 (West 2011); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15 (West 
2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.035 (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-202 
(2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.020 (West 
2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-26 (West 
2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (West 2011); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 
(McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-2 (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 12.1-31.2-02 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26 (West 2011); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.718 (West 
2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-15-
3 (West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-3 
(2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-603 (West 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 81.001 
(West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-108 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 
§ 1103 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.10 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 10.99.050 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-501 (West 2011); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105 (West 2011). 
16 UMass Law Review v. 7 | 10 
no longer limited to heterosexual married couples. On the other hand, 
the expansion is overbroad and leads to peculiar results.21 Coverage of 
household members could and should include intimate partners who 
live together but also may include, for instance, law school 
roommates. Thus, the remedies in these statutes, which are designed 
primarily to protect those who are being coercively controlled, are ill-
suited as a response to an altercation between non-intimate roommates. 
In addition to enlarging the categories of protected persons, states 
are paying more attention to the insidious linkage between intimate 
terrorism and other areas. For instance, after decades of denying the 
interrelationship between child rearing and intimate terrorism, most 
states now permit or mandate that judges consider past or extant 
domestic violence when determining child custody.22 After years of 
blindness towards the co-existence between child abuse and intimate 
terrorism, many child protection agencies now have domestic violence 
experts housed within the agency.23 This represents the sensible 
realization that helping a mother who is a victim of intimate terrorism 
has benefits that redound to the child.24 
Prosecutors, law enforcement, and criminal courts have also 
altered their approaches. The mandatory arrest and mandatory 
prosecution waves of the 1990s changed the ways that police interact 
at the scene and how prosecutors treat these cases in court. New 
crimes have been legislated, such as criminalizing the violation of a 
protection order.25 Batterers’ treatment programs, although 
controversial, are increasingly common.26 Statutes authorizing the 
global positioning system (GPS) monitoring of offenders are among 
the current legal changes underway.27 
The majority of laws concerning domestic violence are found at 
the state level. However, federal laws now aid in combating the 
societal scourge of intimate terrorism. Most prominent is the Violence 
                                                            
21 See infra Part V.C. 
22 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31A (West 2011). 
23 See Ali Stieglitz et al., Making Child Support Safe, Coordinating Child 
Support and Public Assistance Agencies in Their Response to Domestic Violence, 
U.S. DEP’T. OF HHS: ACF OCSE REP. (May 2001), available at http: //www.acf.hhs
.gov/programs/cse/pubs/reports/mpr8548300/. 
24 Justine Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of 
Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565 (2004). 
25 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 2011). 
26 Id. § 10. 
27 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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Against Women Act.28 Other federal enactments include laws against 
stalking, itself a relatively new crime that is carried out 
disproportionately by intimate or formerly intimate partners.29 
The obvious progress notwithstanding, much work remains. Critics 
justly lament the legal system’s inability to effectively deal with the 
problem despite the increased attention and resources that have been 
provided.30 Further, some of the advancements have supplied a new 
crop of problems. For instance, increased public awareness and new 
laws have led to the perception, and the occasional reality, that the 
system is being gamed to gain advantage in custody and divorce 
proceedings or, more perniciously, is simply anti-male. On the other 
hand, there is a view among victims, batterers, and on-lookers alike 
that a protection order is a piece of paper that offers little protection.31 
In Black and Blue, Fran talked about how batterers and victims both 
viewed a protection order as “a joke, made, as they say, to be 
broken.”32 
Intimate terrorism is thus a dance that consists of one step forward 
and two steps backward or two steps forward and one step backward. 
Whatever the precise choreography at a given moment, much is left to 
do. Into this current state of affairs, technology has been thrust and is a 
reality that demands a reckoning.33 
III. INTIMATE TERRORISM AND TECHNOLOGY 
Technology is a two-way street. It can give an intimate terrorist 
enhanced capacity to threaten, intimidate, and monitor his victim; it 
can also be used to benefit a survivor. GPS technology can track 
intimate terrorists to an effort to ensure they stay away from court-
                                                            
28 Violence Against Women and Dep’t of Just. Reauthorization Act (VAWA) of 
2005, 42 U.S.C.A. § 13701 (West 2010). 
29 The Model Stalking Code Revisited, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
13 (Jan. 2007), available at http: //www.ncvc.orgv/src/AGP.Net/Components
/DocumentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=45930. 
30 LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE (2012). 
31 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005) (doing little to 
dispel the notion the protection orders are ineffectual when it declared that the holder 
of a protection order did not have an entitlement to have that order enforced by the 
police). 
32 QUINDLEN, supra note 5, at 64. 
33 See Jill P. Dimond et al., Domestic Violence and Information Communication 
Technologies, 23(5) INTERACTING WITH COMPUTERS 413 (2011) (discussing the pros 
and cons of technology as reported by victims). 
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ordered exclusion zones.34 Technology leaves a trail in its wake; that 
trail may be admissible in court against an intimate terrorist.35 
Further, to successfully escape, a survivor must create a plan that 
helps her get or keep away from the perpetrator.36 On-line resources 
can be invaluable to a survivor in her efforts to escape. However, on-
line research can be perilous for a survivor. An intimate terrorist can, 
through the use of spyware or keystroke technology, ascertain the 
details of a survivor’s computer usage.37 These details may reveal the 
resources a survivor has used to get help or how she is planning to 
escape.38 A perpetrator’s increased access, by virtue of technology, to 
a survivor’s plans for escape—either from a shared household or from 
the relationship—places the survivor at increased risk of harm due to 
the phenomenon known as separation assault. 39 
Separation assault means that the survivor is at greater risk when 
she is seeking to leave the batterer. When one accepts that intimate 
terrorism is about the perpetrator’s coercive control of his partner—or 
ex-partner—separation assault is sadly predictable. The perpetrator 
realizes that his efforts at control are failing when he learns of his 
victim’s plans to leave. He then redoubles his attempts to control, 
often leading to assault at the time of separation. 
In Black and Blue, where the violence continued for years, one 
might long to ask Fran, “Why did you stay?”And if asked, Fran might 
explain with the taunt once delivered by her police officer husband, 
“What the hell [are you] going to tell the cops?”40 However an 
                                                            
34 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
35 See State v. Sukin, No. 24585-3-III, 2007 WL 2254425, at *2 (Wash. App. 
Div. 3 Aug. 7, 2007); Commonwealth v. Thissell, 910 N.E.2d 943 (Mass. 2009); 
Commonwealth v. Cushna, No. 08–P–5, 2009 WL 763743, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 
Mar. 25, 2009); Ruise v. State, 43 So. 3d 885 (Fla. 2010). 
36 See NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http: //www.nnedv.org
/resources/stats/gethelp.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012); NAT’L COAL. AGAINST 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http:// www.ncadv.org/protectyourself/MyPersonalSafetyPlan
.php. (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
37 See infra Part III.B.2. 
38 See Dimond, supra note 33 (many advocacy websites now instruct victims on 
how to lessen, if not eliminate their non-paper trail. For instance the Nat’l Network 
to End Domestic Violence has the following message on its website’s homepage: 
“SAFETY ALERT: If you are in danger, please use a safer computer, or call 911, a 
local hotline, or the U.S. Nat’l Domestic Violence Hotline at 1-800-799-7233 and 
TTY 1-800-787-3224. Learn more technology safety tips. There is always a 
computer trail, but you can leave this site quickly.”). 
39 Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65 
(1991). 
40 QUINDLEN, supra note 5. 
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individual survivor might respond to the “why did you stay?” query, it 
is now axiomatically regarded as the wrong question: a question that 
blames the survivor for the violence she endures.41 
But Fran did ultimately leave—or disappear as she would have 
said.42 After the abuse increased in severity and she realized the impact 
of it on her son, she reached out to people who could help her escape. 
At the nucleus of her exit strategy was her ability to remain hidden 
from Bobby, her husband as well as her intimate terrorist. 
Here’s where the insidiousness of technology comes into play. If 
Bobby had access to technology, he could have coercively controlled 
Fran, in part through monitoring her activities.43 He could have found 
out what friends or professionals she was contacting to assist in her 
escape by accessing her computer through spyware or through her 
improvident posts on social networking sites.44 In that way, he may 
have been able to prevent her from escaping in the first place. 
As it was, Bobby had to wait until his son surreptitiously called 
him, at which point he used his police contacts to unscramble the 
telephone number.45 Today, however, Bobby could have found Fran 
by virtue of GPS technology on his son’s phone. He would not have 
needed his police contacts. 
A. Taxonomy of Technology: Definitions and Uses 
Technology is difficult to define. While certain understandings are 
summoned up by the use of various terms, a precise shared meaning is 
often lacking. Although common understandings may be elusive, two 
diverse examples of recent technologies that are used in intimate 
terrorism are defined as follows: (1) social media: “forms of electronic 
                                                            
41 The question has staying power because it is difficult for those not enmeshed 
in a domestic violence situation to truly understand the power that an intimate 
terrorist has against his victim. Two of the four factors that Johnson uses to define 
the intimate terrorist are undermining the will to resist and undermining the ability to 
resist. An understanding of these two factors explains why she didn’t leave. Getting 
to a place where the question itself is rarely asked is a larger, perhaps impossible, 
task. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 269. 
42 QUINDLEN, supra note 5; see also Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: 
Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Order, 
72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303 (2011) (Survivors who leave often return. This is true for a 
myriad of reasons.). 
43 Even before current technologies expanded, monitoring was one of the four 
non-violent tactics used by intimate terrorists. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27. 
44 See, e.g., Katherine F. Clevenger, Spousal Abuse Through Spyware, 21 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIM. L. 653 (2008). 
45 QUINDLEN, supra note 5, at 273. 
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communication (as Web sites for social networking and 
microblogging) through which users create online communities to 
share information, ideas, personal message, and other content”; (2) 
global positioning system: “a navigational system using satellite 
signals to fix the location of a radio receiver on or above the earth’s 
surface: also the radio receiver so used.”46 
Although these terms are capable of definition, they are inherently 
inexact. The vast fluidity in the definitions has created problems 
crafting legal responses such as appropriate legislation, where the clear 
definition of terms is critical to proper application of the law to cover 
its intended purpose.47 Also, technology can transform common items, 
such as a telephone, with new uses that stretch the law. In one case, an 
appellate court refused to sustain a conviction for harassing telephone 
calls because, although a telephone was used, the messages came via 
text. Texting was beyond the meaning of the statute.48 Thus, harassing 
telephone calls were illegal, but the same texted content via the same 
device (a telephone) was not. 
B. How Technology is Used in Intimate Terrorism 
1. Social Media 
Social media is a now-ubiquitous technology that connects people 
virtually.49 Social media sites include Facebook, Twitter, and 
Tumblr.50 These media sites are touted for their utility in making and 
maintaining connections. One general consequence of technology is its 
lessening of a personal sense of privacy boundaries.51 This effect is 
vividly displayed in the use of social media. What people post on their 
Facebook walls makes many cringe including, though perhaps at a 
                                                            
46 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 542 (11th ed. (2003). 
47 See infra Part IV. 
48 Commonwealth v. Lane, No. 09-P-2134, 2011 WL 383024, at *1 (Mass. App. 
Ct. Feb. 8, 2011). 
49 See Andrew R. Sorkin, Those Millions on Facebook? Some May Not Actually 
Visit, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2012 9:39 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/06
/those-millions-on-facebook-some-may-not-actually-visit/ (the exact number of users 
may be unknown; even the definition of users is in dispute). 
50 23 Types of Social Media, ONBLOGGINGWELL.COM (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:23 PM), 
http://onbloggingwell.com/23-types-of-social-media-sites/. 
51 Andrew King-Ries, Teens, Technology, and Cyberstalking: The Domestic 
Violence Wave of the Future?, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 131 (2011). 
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later date, the individuals who made the postings. Worse yet, 
impulsive postings can be used later as indicia of wrongdoing.52 
In addition to blurring the boundaries of privacy, social media can 
also be used for nefarious purposes. Intimate terrorists can use 
Facebook, for example, to spread harmful, untrue information about 
survivors in a venue where many people—often friends (or friends of 
friends) or relatives who are known to both parties—will be able to see 
it.53 This use can affect the survivor’s will or ability to leave. 
Intimate terrorists can also use the information that survivors 
unwisely post to gain knowledge of their activities.54 This knowledge 
can, in turn, help the intimate terrorist to more effectively terrorize his 
victim or thwart her escape. If Facebook had existed at the time of 
Black and Blue, Fran or young Robert could have unwittingly posted 
information on it that would have provided Bobby with leads about 
their location. 
2. Software and Hardware 
There are several types of technology that are increasingly misused 
by the intimate terrorist. These include spyware and keystroke 
technology.55 Spyware, a specific type of malware,56 is defined as 
software “that is installed in a computer without the user’s knowledge 
and transmits information about the user’s computer activities over the 
Internet.”57 Spyware can be installed remotely or through physical 
                                                            
52 See William Glaberson, N.Y.C. Police Maligned Paradegoers on Facebook, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/ny region/on-
facebook-nypd (police officer’s posting referring to West Indians as “savages” and 
terming Internal Affairs officers “rats”). 
53 Id. 
54 See Law Enforcement Guidelines, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com
/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
55 See, e.g., Melissa F. Brown, Safety and Security in a Digital Age, S.C. LAW. 
(July 2010), available at http: //www.scbar.org/MemberResources/Publications
/SouthCarolinaLawyer.aspx (There are also pre-paid phone cards, whose technology 
may be available through smart phone applications. SPOOFCARDS or LIARCARDS 
permit callers to disguise their identity—including changing voice gender—when 
making calls. TRAPCALL, on the other hand, reveals caller identity and phone 
number even when the caller has a blocked or unlisted number.). 
56 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/malware 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
57 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/spyware 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
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access to a computer.58 It is not necessarily a virus and therefore may 
not be detected and removed through anti-virus software. Spyware 
continuously monitors a person’s computer usage by recording the 
contents of a computer screen every few seconds.59 
Keystroke technology is hardware, which, installed directly on a 
computer, records all keystrokes.60 This information is stored on a 
miniscule hard drive and allows access to typically confidential items 
such as passwords and personal identification numbers. It is also 
reported that this technology is installed on certain smart phones.61 
Spyware and keystroke technology have legitimate purposes. They 
can be used, for example, to appropriately monitor a child’s computer 
usage. But, these technologies are easily used by intimate terrorists to 
monitor their victims. Imagine if Bobby could access all websites that 
Fran visited, all the emails or texts that she sent, all telephone calls that 
she made, as well as any activity on their on-line bank account. In this 
highly digitized age, it would be nearly impossible for Fran to escape 
Bobby without using computers, telephones, or internet resources. 
3. Global Positioning Systems 
A GPS is a navigational system that uses satellite signals to fix the 
location of a radio receiver.62 Unstated but implicit is this: if the radio 
receiver is affixed to something, the location of that something is 
known or knowable. The radio receiver can be attached to or designed 
into a car.63 It can be part of a smart phone or tablet computer that 
accompanies a person throughout the day.64 
GPS technology can be used easily by intimate terrorists. Survivors 
who are trying to escape their abusers or think they have already done 
so can be tracked constantly. As one private investigator put it, the 
technology “to the victim is just as terrorizing as seeing [a face] in the 
                                                            
58 Southworth, supra note 11, at 7; see also, Cindy Southworth & Sarah Tucker, 
Technology, Stalking and Domestic Violence Victims, 76 MISS. L.J. 667 (2007) 
(providing overview of all types of technology). 
59 Clevenger, supra note 44. 
60 Southworth, supra note 11, at 7 (keystroke technology can also be software). 
61 Katherine Rushton, Software on Android Phones ‘Tracking Every Keystroke’, 
THE TELEGRAM (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/mobile-
phones/8927164/Software-on-Android-phones-tracking-every-key-stroke.html. 
62 See supra Part III.A. 
63 See ONSTAR, http://www.onstar.com (Apr. 4, 2012). 
64 CES: GPS Soon to [sic] Integrated with Field Computers and Smartphones, 
TMCNET.COM (Sept. 27, 2010), http://m2m.tmcnet.com/topics/m2mevolution
/articles/104560-ces-gps-soon-integrated-with-field-computers-smartphones.htm. 
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window at night before they [sic] go to bed.”65 Threats and 
intimidation, monitoring, undermining the will of the victim to resist, 
and undermining the ability of the victim to resist: these are the tactics 
of the intimate terrorist.66 Each of these tactics is made easier, scarier, 
and deadlier by the technologies described above.67 
IV. LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON 
INTIMATE TERRORISM 
A. Anti-Stalking Statutes 
Stalking and intimate terrorism can go hand-in-hand. Stalking 
behavior goes to the heart of the intimate terrorist’s monitoring 
strategy as described by Johnson.68 Technology can make the stalker 
appear omnipresent and omniscient to the victim. GPS technology, 
whether on cars or telephones, allows an intimate terrorist to know the 
whereabouts of his victim at all times.69 Her attempts to evade him are 
ineffectual as technology makes her easy to find. In one case, for 
instance, a husband put a GPS tracking device on his wife’s car and 
installed spyware on her cell phone. The wife left after a domestic 
violence incident, but her husband sent her text messages 
demonstrating that he knew her whereabouts and was monitoring 
her.70 
Stalking is a relatively new crime.71 It gained notoriety early on in 
several high profile cases where the stalker was obsessed with the 
victim, but did not know her personally.72 In reality, however, stalking 
is not usually a crime between strangers. Stalkers know their victims; 
                                                            
65 Erik Eckholm, Private Snoops Find GPS Trail Legal to Follow, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/us/gps-devices-are-being-used-
to-track-cars-and-errant-spouses.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all. 
66 See supra Part I. 
67 See M.M. v. J.B., No. CN08-05322, 2010 WL 1200329, at *6 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
Jan. 12, 2010) (person subject to a protection order put a GPS tracker on the victim’s 
car shortly after the protection order was entered). 
 68 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 102–3. 
69 See Minnesota v. Hormann, 805 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
70 Id. 
71 The first stalking statute was in Cal. in 1990. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 
2011). 
72 Ashley Beagle, Modern Stalking Laws: A Survey of State Anti-Stalking 
Statutes Considering Modern Mediums and Constitutional Challenges, 14 CHAP. L. 
REV. 457, 467-69 (2011). 
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77% of female stalking victims are stalked by someone they know and 
59% are stalked by current or former intimate partners.73 
All states now have anti-stalking statutes.74 Congress passed an 
anti-stalking statute in 1996.75 Unfortunately, technology has made 
some of these statutes virtually obsolete and, in some circumstances, 
counterproductive. Original anti-stalking statutes often required the 
stalker to be visually or physically proximate to the victim. Now, 
however, the victim can be found and stalked remotely. The stalker 
can access her computer or smart phone. Even for the non-tech savvy 
person, technological stalking is surprisingly easy. On-line step-by-
step instructions chillingly show the way.76 
The impact of technology on the crime of stalking was addressed 
in the 2007 revision of the Model Stalking Code.77 Congress and some 
individual states have modified their stalking laws. For instance, New 
Jersey amended its stalking statute, effective in 2009, to define 
stalking as a “course of conduct” . . . by “any action, method, device, 
or means . . . surveilling . . . a person.”78 The legislative history, taken 
from the revised Model Stalking Code, provides that the new language 
is meant to cover stalking through technology such as GPS tracking of 
a victim’s car.79 Likewise, Alaska amended its stalking statute last 
year. It now includes following or monitoring a victim by GPS or by 
installing a device—including software—on a victim’s computer, 
telephone, vehicle, or at her work place or residence.80 
Recently, the high-tech crime of cyberstalking has garnered 
attention.81 Anti-cyberstalking laws generally preclude acts that occur 
                                                            
73 The Model Stalking Statute Revisited, supra note 30, at 13. 
74 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-5-38 (2) (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 14-07.1-19 (2009); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 335.1A (2)(a) (2011). 
75 12 U.S.C.A. § 2261 (West 2012). 
76 John Loveall, Stalking by a “High Tech” Guy: A View from the Other Side 
NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (2005), available at http://www.ncvc.org/src
/AGP.Net/Components/DocumentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=41389. 
77 The Model Stalking Statute Revisited, supra note 29. 
78 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10 (West 2011) (emphasis added); see also ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-A (2011) (Maine similarly defines “course of 
conduct” in its stalking statute). 
79 An Act concerning stalking and amending P.L. 1994, c. 119, Assembly, No. 
1563—L.2009, ch. 28 (N.J. 2008) (the new law also enhances the severity of the 
crime of stalking, including in circumstances where it occurs in contravention of a 
protection order). 
80 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.135 (a) (West 2011). 
81 See generally Naomi Goodno, Cyberstalking, A New Crime: Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Law, 72 MO. L. REV. 125 (2007). 
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via the internet, with computers, or networking. An anti-cyberstalking 
statute, therefore, would not bar stalking by GPS or spyware.82 The 
drafters of the Model Stalking Statute, Revisited, have expressed 
concern about potential confusion between stalking and cyberstalking 
statutes. The revised model stalking law covers technological advances 
but is in fact broader in coverage than are most cyberstalking 
statutes.83 
B. GPS Monitoring of Offenders 
GPS monitoring may be ordered for persons charged with crimes 
involving domestic violence.84 Some states have added GPS tracking 
language to statutes specifically dealing with domestic violence 
offenders.85 In other states, such statutes are pending.86 These statutes 
are found scattershot throughout state codes. They are located in 
criminal codes, family law codes, and independent civil protection 
order statutes.87 
Although a state may not have a law specifically authorizing the 
use of GPS technology in domestic violence cases, that monitoring 
still may be available. Many domestic violence crimes are prosecuted 
under traditional criminal statutes, such as assault, battery, stalking, 
rape, and murder. Therefore, if a jurisdiction has authority to order 
GPS monitoring of standard offenses, domestic violence cases should 
be included within that mandate. 
Domestic violence/GPS (hereinafter “DV/GPS”) statutes may be 
categorized by whether they sanction monitoring in the pre-trial or 
post-conviction phase. Some statutes permit GPS monitoring as part of 
conditional release for persons accused of violating a protection 
order.88 Other statutes apply only after a person has been found guilty 
of a crime involving domestic violence—perhaps the violation of a 
protection order, perhaps another crime—and receives probation rather 
than jail or prison time.89 
                                                            
82 Id. 
83 The Model Stalking Statute Revisited, supra note 29, at 64. 
84 The DV/GPS statutes generally use the term domestic violence, so that term, 
rather than intimate terrorism, will be used through this section. 
85 Ariana Green, More States Use GPS to Track Abusers, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 
2009), http://nytimes.com/2009/05/09/us/09gps.html. 
86 See, e.g., WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, available at http://www.womenslaw
project.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2012). 
87 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.761 (West 2011). 
88 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-217 (West 2011). 
89 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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1. Pre-Trial Monitoring 
Some statutes permit GPS monitoring in a pre-trial circumstance. 
Often, the crime alleged is violation of a civil protection order.90 
Accordingly, the defendant, although in a pre-trial status, has already 
been ordered, at a minimum, not to abuse the victim, and is alleged to 
have violated that order. Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
North Dakota are among the states that have statutes permitting pre-
trial monitoring.91 The Arkansas and Texas statutes discussed below 
are fairly representative of this class of statute. 
Under Arkansas’s Family Law Code, a defendant charged with 
violating either an ex parte or final order of protection may be released 
provided he is placed under electronic surveillance.92 The statute 
specifically defines the type of electronic monitoring, which may lead 
to problems as technology changes.93 Surveillance is defined as 
“active”94 technology that is a “single-piece device that immediately 
notifies law enforcement . . . of a violation of the distance 
requirements.”95 The technology can be tracked by “satellite or cellular 
phone tower triangulation.”96 
In Texas, a person charged with an offense of family violence97 
may be ordered to “carry or wear” a GPS device “as a condition of 
release on bond.”98 Prior to entering such an order, the judicial officer 
is compelled to consider the likely deterrent effect of such 
                                                            
90 In many states, the violation of a protection order is a separate crime. 
91 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-217 (West 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 
(West 2011); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 335.1A (2)(a) (2011); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 99-5-38 (2) (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-07.1-19 (2009). 
92 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-217 (West 2011). 
93 See id. § 9-15-217(C) (the surveillance is to be at the defendant’s expense). 
94 GPS technology is either active or passive. Active technology reports location 
information nearly instantaneously. Passive technology uploads the data several 
times a day—not often enough to protect a victim. Robert S. Gable, Left to Their 
Own Devices: Should Manufacturers of Offender Monitoring Equipment be Liable 
for Design Defect?, 2009(2) U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 333, 337 (2009). 
95 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-217(C). 
96 See id. § 9-15-217(C). 
97 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (West 2011) (family violence is defined as an 
act by a household or family member that is intended to result in physical harm, 
bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the 
member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault, 
but does not include defensive measures to protect oneself). 
98 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.49(b)(2) (West 2011) (like Ark., a 
defendant must pay the cost of monitoring but, if he is indigent, he may be ordered to 
pay less than the full cost of the GPS monitoring). 
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monitoring.99 Further, the judicial officer must seek input from a 
victim as to the areas from which the defendant is to be excluded. The 
judicial officer also must provide the victim with information 
regarding: 1) her right to participate or refuse to participate; 2) the 
functioning and limitations of the technology and “the extent to which 
the system will track and record the victim’s location and movements; 
3) the locations from which the defendant is barred; 4) sanctions 
available in the event of a violation; 5) the procedures to follow if the 
GPS monitoring fails; and 6) the lack of confidentiality for the 
victim’s communications with the court.100 
2. Post-Conviction Monitoring 
Other states permit DV/GPS monitoring only after a defendant has 
been found to have violated an order of protection.101 Massachusetts 
was one of the first states to enact DV/GPS legislation. In 2007, it 
amended its Abuse Prevention statute (209A) to provide that a court 
may, in lieu of incarceration and as a condition of probation, order that 
a defendant “wear a global positioning satellite tracking device 
designed to transmit and record the defendant’s location data.”102 If a 
defendant enters an “exclusion zone,” that information is transmitted 
“immediately” to the victim and the police.103 A court finding that the 
defendant entered the exclusion zone will result in the revocation of 
probation. Although this statute is more than four years old, as of 
January 2012, just 96 DV offenders were wearing GPS monitors and 
being tracked by the Massachusetts Department of Probation.104 
In Kentucky, GPS monitoring is also an option only after a 
defendant has been found to have engaged in a “substantial violation” 
of a protection order.105 The court, before imposing monitoring, must 
give the victim certain information, similar to that mandated in 
Texas.106 The Kentucky statute also specifically gives the offender the 
right to provide information as to why monitoring ought not be 
                                                            
99 Id. at 17.49(b)(2). 
100 Id. 
101 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 2011); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 403.761 (West 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9 (i)(1) (West 2011). 
102 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 2011). 
103 Id. 
104 E-mail from Steven Bocko, Mass. Dep’t of Probation, to author (Jan. 24, 
2012, 03:11 PM) (on file with U. MASS. L. REV.). 
105 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.761 (West 2011). 
106 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.49(b)(2) (West 2011). 
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imposed.107 Before ordering monitoring, the court must consider the 
likelihood that the offender will “seek to kill, assault, stalk, harass, 
menace, or otherwise threaten” the victim without the imposition of 
GPS monitoring.108 The court is also required to make findings of fact 
regarding the granting or denying of a monitoring request.109 
3. Pre-Trial and Post-Conviction Monitoring 
Several states allow for GPS monitoring after either a charge and 
or a conviction. In Oklahoma, for instance, a defendant who is alleged 
to have either violated a protection order or committed other offenses 
of domestic violence, including stalking, may be required to use a GPS 
monitoring device.110 Before entering such an order, the court must 
find that the defendant has a “history that demonstrates an intent to 
commit violence against the victim . . . ”111 In addition, the court may 
permit the victim to monitor the defendant’s location; however, the 
statute specifically limits monitoring by the victim to areas that 
implicate her safety.112 Oklahoma also permits the use of GPS 
monitoring of a defendant who has been convicted of violating a 
protective order.113 Illinois similarly permits both pre-trial and post-
conviction monitoring.114 
4. Constitutional Issues 
The use of GPS technology in law enforcement has been 
challenged on a variety of grounds.115 In U.S. v. Jones, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the police may not install a GPS device on a 
suspect’s car without a valid search warrant.116 The case raised legal 
issues largely different from those found in DV/GPS statutes; its 
                                                            
107 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.761(5) (West 2011). 
108 Id. § 403.761(7)(a). 
109 Id. § 403.761(7)(b). 
110 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.17 (West 2011). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 60.6 (West 2011). 
114 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8A-7 (West 2011) (Enacted in 2009, this 
statute was introduced following the killing of Cindy Bischof, by her ex-boyfriend.). 
115 See, e.g., People v. Randolf, 84 Cal. Rptr. 559 (2006); United States v. 
Sparks, 750 F.Supp.2d 384 (D. Mass. 2010); Com v. Raposo, 905 N.E.2d. 545 
(2009); Com v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d. 187 (2009). See also Zoila Hinson, GPS 
Monitoring and Constitutional Rights, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 285 (2008). 
116 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012). 
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impact, therefore, is indirect.117 The opinion does provide a window, 
however, into the Court’s thinking on the Fourth Amendment 
considerations of GPS monitoring.118 
Although unanimous in outcome, the Court split 5-4 in its 
rationale. The five person majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, 
found that the placement and use of the device on Jones’s car was a 
search.119 Scalia’s majority opinion focused on the physical intrusion 
involved in planting the device, which was the basis for search and 
seizure law until the 1960s.120 However, more recent Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence has focused on 
reasonable expectations of privacy, not on physical intrusions.121 
Therefore, the impact of a return to a property-based inquiry remains 
to be seen. Certainly, it is a curious twist for a technology case, as 
                                                            
117 Santry, supra note 10, at 1110–14 (for instance, DV offenders are monitored 
so that they do not enter into exclusions zones—such places that the victim 
inhabits—that have already been legally declared off-limits in a protection order. 
Offenders, therefore, would be unable to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
these areas). 
118 Although Jones involved drugs, GPS tracking by police could be used in 
cases involving domestic violence. In Wisconsin v. Sveum, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court upheld the police use of GPS to track an alleged stalker, notwithstanding 
assertions of Fourth Amendment violations. Wisconsin v. Sveum, 787 N.W.2d 317, 
330-33 (2010). In that case, however, unlike Jones, a valid warrant was issued to 
authorize the installation of the GPS device. Id. 
119 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 n.2 (The car belong to Jones’s wife but the Court 
found that he had “at least the property rights of a bailee.”). 
120 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-353 (1967); see also Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739, 740 (1979) (“In Katz, Government agents had 
intercepted the contents of a telephone conversation by attaching an electronic 
listening device to the outside of a public phone booth. The Court rejected the 
argument that a ‘search’ can occur only when there has been a ‘physical intrusion’ 
into a ‘constitutionally protected area,’ noting that the Fourth Amendment ‘protects 
people, not places.’ Because the Government’s monitoring of Katz’ conversation 
‘violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone 
booth,’ the Court held that it ‘constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
121 Smith, 442 U.S. at 739 (“Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has 
held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person 
invoking its protection can claim a “justifiable,” a “reasonable,” or a “legitimate 
expectation of privacy” that has been invaded by government action. E.g., Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 
U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36, (1973); Mancusi v. 
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368, (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)”). See U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. 
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technological techniques are increasingly available without any need 
for a physical trespass. 
Justice Alito, in an opinion concurring in the judgment only, took 
issue with the majority’s reliance on a trespass-based analysis.122 
Alito’s opinion retained the focus of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test articulated in U.S. v. Katz.123 Relevant to the issues here, 
Alito’s concurrence considers the often non-physical element of new 
technology, much of which can be installed from afar.124 
The result in Jones is clear, despite the differing rationales. Police 
must obtain a warrant before they can physically place a GPS tracking 
device on a suspect’s automobile. Less clear, in part because of the 
differing rationales, is the decision’s effect on the current crop of 
DV/GPS tracking laws.125 
V. A VIEW TO THE FUTURE 
Technology’s impact on intimate terrorism—for good and for ill—
is inescapable. On the one hand, intimate terrorists will continue to 
exploit new methods that expand their ability to coercively control 
their quarry. However, victims may be able to combat technological 
assaults as well as use technology to gain safety. The impact of 
technology will be ever-changing as technological methods advance. 
The following issues will require on-going attention as both law and 
technology evolve, doubtless at an uneven pace. 
A. GPS Monitoring 
Monitoring of intimate terrorists via GPS technology creates both 
legal and non-legal challenges. They include the constitutionality of 
monitoring, its efficacy, its technological capability, and its proper 
implementation. 
1. Constitutionality 
The constitutionality of the monitoring of intimate terrorists will 
vary, depending on the language of a particular statute and to whom 
                                                            
122 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957-59 (Alito, J., concurring) (Justice Sotomayor also 
wrote a concurring opinion, but she joined with Justice Scalia’s opinion as well.). 
123 Id. at 958-963. 
124 Id. 
125 See, e.g., Shaun B. Spencer, GPS Monitoring Device Leads the Supreme 
Court to a Crossroads in Privacy Law, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 45 (2012). 
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and how it is applied. GPS monitoring already has been subjected to 
Fourth Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due Process challenges.126 
The Fourth Amendment implications of GPS monitoring are 
addressed in U.S. v. Jones.127 In Jones, the U. S. Supreme Court held 
that placing a GPS device on the undercarriage of a car was a search 
for which a valid warrant was required.128 However, the Court has also 
found no reasonable expectation of privacy exists as cars travel on 
public streets.129 Thus, Jones provides a reasonable justification for 
law enforcement to attach a GPS monitoring based on tracking a 
device onto an automobile as it travels public thoroughfares.130 
However, a car parked in a private garage does involve reasonable 
expectations of privacy.131 Therefore, GPS technology that tracks a 
vehicle into non-public spheres may implicate the Fourth Amendment. 
So may GPS capacity on devices such as a smartphone or iPad, when 
those are taken into non-public areas. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
already found that the use of technology that invades a private home 
requires a warrant.132 
Whether a valid reasonable expectation of privacy argument exists 
for the intimate terrorist will likely turn on whether the monitoring 
occurs pre-trial or post-conviction. In post-conviction situations, the 
GPS monitoring tracks whether the intimate terrorist is entering an 
area from which he already has been excluded by court order. In that 
setting, at least, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy and thus 
no Fourth Amendment trigger.133 Even in those circumstances, 
however, GPS technology may capture movement data beyond the 
exclusion zones, thus raising expectation-of-privacy concerns. These 
circumstances may be alleviated by a monitoring technology called 
reverse tagging, which is only triggered when the intimate terrorist 
enters the exclusion zone.134 
                                                            
126 See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945; Sveum, 787 N.W.2d at 317. See also U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV, V, XIV. 
127 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945. 
128 See discussion supra Part III.B.3. 
129 See generally United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (involved 
placing a radio transmitter in a container in a vehicle). 
130 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946.Id. 
131 See Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
132 See, e.g., id. at 40. 
133 The trespass-based theory reinvigorated by Jones may, however, create new 
ways to argue Fourth Amendment violations. Santry, supra note 10; see also Jones, 
132 S. Ct at 957 (Alito, J., concurring). 
134 Santry, supra note 10, at 1121-22. 
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Several states authorize GPS monitoring of an intimate terrorist 
who has not yet gone to trial.135 Here, obviously, the intimate terrorist 
is still the accused, not the convicted. Although the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that probationers have a lesser liberty interest, that 
rationale would not hold in a pre-trial circumstance.136 Thus, pre-trial 
monitoring has a greater risk of impinging on constitutional freedoms. 
However, if monitoring is imposed as a condition of pre-trial release, 
in lieu of incarceration, monitoring is less of an infringement on liberty 
than is confinement. 
Due Process Clause challenges to monitoring have been sustained, 
at least in pre-trial circumstances, when imposed by statutes requiring 
electronic monitoring for all offenders.137 However, DV/GPS statutes 
generally have an individualized component that may forestall 
successful Due Process challenges. In some states, for instance, the 
monitoring is ordered only after a dangerousness or lethality 
assessment.138 Elsewhere, it is done after a finding of the risk the 
offender poses to the victim.139 
Equal Protection Clause issues arise if an intimate terrorist is 
rendered ineligible for monitoring because of penury.140 Most GPS 
statutes require that the offender pay the costs of the monitoring.141 To 
avert this concern, some states explicitly authorize community service 
or a sliding scale fee.142 Others permit third parties or organizations to 
cover the cost.143 Another approach is used in Illinois. It has instituted 
fines for domestic violence offenders; such fines are placed in the 
Domestic Violence Surveillance Fund, which may be used for low 
income offenders.144 Measures like these help avoid successful Equal 
Protection Clause challenges. 
                                                            
135 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
136 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987). 
137 United States v. Polouizzi, 697 F.Supp.2d 381, 390-95 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(finding unconstitutional, as applied, provisions of the Adam Walsh Act that require 
electronic monitoring in any case involving a minor victim). 
138 Hinson, supra note 115, at 286. 
139 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 403.761(7)(a) (West 2011). 
140 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1987) (“a state can no more discriminate 
on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.”). 
141 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 2007). 
142 See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 335.1 A(2)(C) (2011) 
(community service); See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 765.6 b(6) (West 2011). 
143 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9 (j) (West 2011). 
144 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-9-1.6 (a) (West 2011); see also Bryan 
Thompson, Changes in the Cindy Bischof Law, 24 D.C.B.A. BRIEF 40 (2011). 
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2. Effectiveness and Technological Capacity 
The efficacy of GPS monitoring is unclear. Some studies suggest 
that the monitoring yields a modest decline in recidivism.145 Others 
suggest that there is no statistically significant difference between 
those on electronic monitors and a control group.146 
Even if GPS monitoring in domestic violence cases is shown to 
deter future incidents of domestic violence, it is only as good as the 
technology that supports it. There are several types of GPS devices 
available, including passive devices that do not transmit location data 
with enough frequency to enhance safety.147 Moreover, GPS 
technology may depend on the cellular capacity in a region, thus 
creating problems for mountainous or rural areas. Problems can also 
arise in urban areas, due to dense building structures.148 And nothing is 
perfect. Technology, or the devices that support it, can fail. There 
already have been lawsuits against GPS manufacturers for damages 
arising from a failed device.149 Lawsuits aside, if monitoring appears 
to be ineffective, it will not be considered a useful tool to protect 
survivors. 
If the device fails, the monitoring fails. If the monitoring fails, the 
survivor is no better off, and indeed, may be worse off, than she would 
                                                            
145 Mary Ann School, GPS Monitoring May Cause Orwell To Turn In His 
Grave, But Will It Escape Constitutional Challenges? A Look at GPS Monitoring of 
Domestic Violence Offenders in Illinois, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 845, 853 (2010). 
146 See, e.g., Gable, supra note 94, at n.35, 339-42 (2009) (for a discussion of the 
studies of GPS monitoring effectiveness). 
147 Gable, supra note 94, at 337; Santry, supra note 10, at 1118-19 (for a 
discussion of different types of GPS devices). 
148 Gable, supra note 94, at 337. 
149 See, e.g., Turner v. iSecuretrac Corp., No. 03CA70, 2004 WL 944386, at *7 
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2004) (“Turner, a probationer in a monitoring program, 
entered a prohibited area and seriously injured his wife. He was not wearing a 
monitoring anklet at the time because a defective device had not been promptly 
replaced by the manufacturer. The state district appellate court denied the plaintiff’s 
claim, holding, in part, that the trial record did not support the plaintiff’s argument 
that the GPS device was defective when it left the manufacturer because it could 
have been damaged in shipment, storage, or while being used by a previous offender. 
Furthermore, even if the probationer had been wearing the passive GPS device at the 
time of the attack, the information about his movements would not have been known 
until after the device was plugged into his home monitoring unit. Therefore, the court 
reasoned, the manufacturer could not have taken action to prevent the attack, so no 
legal cause was established.”); Gable, supra note 94, at 354-55; see also John E. 
Woodard, Oops, My GPS Made Me Do It!: GPS Manufacturer Liability Under a 
Strict Products Liability Paradigm when GPS Fails to Give Accurate Directions to 
GPS End-User, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 429 (2009). 
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be without the monitoring option.150 The recognition of this 
undesirable possibility is seen in the several statutes that specifically 
require a judge, before imposing monitoring on an offender, to apprise 
the victim of the limitations of the technology and the risks involved if 
the technology fails.151 
3. Implementation 
Assume that GPS monitoring is constitutional and that it has been 
demonstrated to protect victims. Further assume that GPS monitoring 
has a highly effective technological capacity. None of this matters if it 
is not being used. Several impediments may prevent monitoring from 
being ordered. First, it is being introduced at a time when state 
budgets, including budgets for courts, corrections, and probation 
departments, are being cut.152 Therefore, as an unfunded mandate, it 
may not be instituted. Second, if defendants cannot afford to pay for it, 
it may not be used. Finally, some professionals in the field, including 
victims’ advocates and prosecutors, may be loath to recommend it if 
they believe that it provides women with a false sense of security.153 
B. Evidentiary Issues 
Technological advances lead to new evidentiary problems.154 
Many of these problems may be resolved through proper application of 
an appropriate evidentiary rule. For example, GPS monitoring will 
yield reports that demonstrate the movements of the offender, 
including impermissible activity in the exclusion zone. These reports 
may be admissible pursuant to more than one evidentiary rule.155 
Courts have a long-established history of responding to and allowing 
                                                            
150 If monitoring is a condition imposed in lieu of incarceration, it seems likely 
that, in some circumstances at least, more intimate terrorists will be confined if 
monitoring is unavailable. In those circumstances the survivor would be, at least 
temporarily, safe. 
151 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.761 (West 2011). 
152 E.g., the city of Topeka, Kansas declined to prosecute prosecuting domestic 
violence misdemeanors for a period during the fall of 2011. See All Things 
Considered: Robert Siegel Discusses Topeka, Kan., Repeals Domestic Violence Law, 
NPR NEWS (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/12/141287214/topeka-
repeals-domestic-violence-law. 
153 See supra Part V.A.2; see also Santry, supra note 10, at 1118-20. 
154 See, e.g., Laurie L. Baughman, Friend Request or Foe?, 19 WIDENER L.J. 
933, 945-53 (2010) (discussing evidentiary implications of technology). 
155 See, e.g., Thissell, 910 N.E.2d at 943 (GPS records sufficiently reliable—
either as non-hearsay evidence or a recognized exception to hearsay rules); see also 
Sukin, 2007 WL 2254425, at *2. 
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the admissibility of new technologies, whether DNA evidence or 
audio-frequency monitoring from an earlier time.156 But judicial 
acceptance of GPS reports or other technologically related evidence 
will not happen overnight. Thus, there will be a period of time during 
which the evidence will be rejected. Further, there may be 
circumstances in which the evidence ought not to be admitted, due to 
authentication or other valid reliability flaws.157 
C. Unintended Consequences 
The National Institute of Justice has recently issued a study on the 
effectiveness of GPS monitoring.158 It demonstrates a beneficial 
reduction of recidivism, at least in some jurisdictions.159 Not all of the 
study’s findings, however, are similarly sanguine. One finding, in fact, 
is quite disturbing. The study indicates that GPS monitoring is being 
ordered for women who have had protection orders issued against 
them in situations involving a non-intimate family member, such as a 
daughter.160 
Although perhaps counterintuitive, this outcome is possible 
because protection orders between two people who are not in an 
intimate relationship are possible. The class of protected persons in 
protection order statutes has been, in general, expanding.161 Moreover, 
family members are nearly always included, so that a parent can seek a 
protection order from a child, a child from a parent, or siblings from 
each other. So although it may be legal to attach a GPS device to a 
woman offender who has violated an order against a daughter, a sister, 
or a mother, that scenario is not the driving force behind GPS 
monitoring legislation. In several states, GPS monitoring statutes were 
introduced after particularly heinous or high-publicity intimate 
terrorist killings.162 Thus, while the imposition of monitoring in these 
                                                            
156 See, e.g., Gable, supra note 94, at 337. 
157 Thissell, 910 N.E.2d at 947 (admitting the evidence, but recommending that 
GPS records be properly attested and certified). 
158 E-mail from Edna Erez, Head of Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Univ. of Ill. at 
Chicago, to author (Mar. 23, 2012, 10:59 a.m.) (on file with U. MASS. L. REV.). 
159 Id. 
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161 See discussion supra Part II. 
162 See, e.g., Sheila Ahern, Tragic Domestic Violence Death Leads to New 
Monitoring Legislation, DAILY HERALD (Mar. 21, 2010), 
http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20100321/news/303219959/; Press Release, 
Dutchess Cty. Leg., GPS Pilot Program to Combat Dutchess Cty. Domestic Violence 
(May 12, 2011), available at http://www.co.dutchess.ny.us/CountyGov/Departments
/Legislature/19139_19737.htm. 
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non-intimate situations may be within the statutory purview, it foretells 
a larger problem. 
This is not the first time that unintended consequences that harm 
victims have arisen from efforts to combat intimate terrorism. During 
the 1990s, for instance, mandatory arrest of batterers was heralded as 
an important part of the solution; states rushed to enact these laws.163 
As a result of these laws, there was an increase in dual arrests, i.e., 
both the victim and the batterer were arrested simultaneously.164 Dual 
arrests occurred when police, upon arriving at the scene, believed that 
they could not sort out the facts to accurately determine the identity of 
the batterer.165 Consequently, the police arrested both the alleged 
victim and alleged batterer. This often happened in circumstances 
where both parties were wounded, but the batterer’s wounds were 
caused defensively by the victim in an effort to protect herself. 
Although the increase in dual arrest eventually led to protocols that 
assist the police in determining the primary aggressor, it also revealed 
a negative side to laws that were perceived as an important advance 
forward.166 Arrest of the victim leads potentially to dual protection 
orders; this provided a new tool of coercion for intimate terrorists—
one that comes accompanied by state power. In part because of these 
negative consequences, mandatory arrest laws are now one of the few 
topics that are subject to criticism by all sides.167 
Similarly, mandatory prosecution laws, once viewed as 
demonstrating that domestic violence crimes will be treated as 
seriously as other types of crimes, are now criticized for, at best, 
ignoring survivors’ wishes. And at their worst, these laws now result 
in the legal system itself coercively controlling the survivor by forcing 
her to bend to the will of the prosecutor. The intimate terrorist’s tactics 
of threats and manipulation are now transformed into a prosecutorial 
tool. For instance, prosecutors may subpoena survivors and, if they fail 
to appear or testify, the prosecutor may levy criminal charges against 
the survivors.168 
                                                            
163 See, e.g., Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea 
or Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1159 (1993). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 1157-59. 
167 Id. at 1157. 
168 See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation 
in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1910 (1996); Casey G. 
Gwinn & Anne O’Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police Officer and 
the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 314 n.43 (1993). 
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Unintended consequences have extended beyond the arrest and 
prosecution of batterers. For example, judges, convinced that children 
may suffer harm when witnessing domestic violence, have started to 
consider the presence of domestic violence in the home when making 
custody determinations. This advance came after years of studying the 
effects of domestic violence on children and advocating those impacts 
to courts and legislatures. 
Intended to protect children and mothers in the legal context of a 
custody battle, these gains instead have been used against adult and 
child survivors of intimate terrorism. Battered women have started to 
lose their children to foster care because the children were present in 
the home when the women were beaten. Thus, the rationale goes, the 
women had permitted their children to be exposed to domestic 
violence with all its pernicious effects by “allowing” the children to be 
at home during their mother’s abuse.169 The knowledge of this 
possibility may deter survivors from calling the police, based on the 
all-too-real fear of losing their children to foster care.170 
In other child custody circumstances, battered women are losing 
custody of their children due to “friendly parent” provisions now 
engrafted onto custody statutes.171 These well-intended provisions are 
meant to protect children from being the victims of inter-parent 
squabbling. Judges are to award custody to the parent who is both 
more likely to encourage the child’s contact with the other parent and 
less likely to disparage the other parent. An intimate terrorist can 
easily portray his victim as the “unfriendly” parent who discourages or 
avoids contact, thus increasing the terrorist’s odds of getting custody 
or, perhaps, simply permitting the terrorist to use the legal system as 
yet another tool in aid of coercive control. 
None of the above issues lend themselves to easy, clear, per se 
resolutions. They do illustrate, however, that advancements intended 
to combat intimate terrorism have a history of being used to the 
detriment of the victims. Initial indications suggest that DV/GPS 
                                                            
169 Dunlap, supra note 24. 
170 Children and Women First? Voices From The Front Lines Of Domestic 
Violence On The Impact Of Child Welfare Reporting (VFC), OFFORD CENTRE FOR 
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statutes may be the next area of progress that will be construed against 
victims. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It has always been hard, and potentially lethal, for the Frans of this 
world to escape the Bobbys. Some do—these are the survivors. Others 
don’t—these are the victims. Technology is, as often as not, an aid to 
the intimate terrorist. The uber-speed of technological advances can 
overwhelm a deliberative legal system’s efforts to thwart technology’s 
negative effects. Although the pace may be ill-matched, efforts must 
continue to prevent the intimate terrorist from enlarging his power 
through technology. Once these efforts yield results, further effort is 
needed to see that intimate terrorism survivors are not harmed by 
measures intended to aid them. 
